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LOCAL ASSOCIATED COUNSEL IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A CALL FOR
CHANGE
Robert L. Misnert
Most federal district courts permit nonresident counsel to appear
pro hac vice' only if the nonresident counsel associates local counsel to
assist in the pending litigation. These courts require association of local,
in-district counsel before they will accept pleadings or allow appear-
ances by nonresident attorneys. The courts delineate the precise re-
quirements of local association by local court rule. 2 The supporters of
local association apparently justify these rules on two bases: protection
of the client and protection of the power and dignity of the court.3 In
practice, however, local rules do not protect the interest of clients;
rather, they affirmatively encroach upon the client's right to choose his
counsel. The local association rules benefit the courts only by enabling
them to control, somewhat autocratically, who can practice before the
court.
Whatever the reason for their existence, the primary effect of the
local association rules is to protect local attorneys from competition and
to provide local attorneys with an association fee when competition is
allowed. This Article maintains that the often-parroted justifications for
the local association rules are illusory and that the rules do not provide
sufficient benefit to courts or clients to justify the present broad scope of
the rules.
Although past attempts to alter the association rules have failed,4
the recent explosion of lawyer malpractice litigation and potential mal-
practice liability of local associated counsel may soon generate signifi-
cant changes in the rules. The relatively small fees earned by local
counsel do not justify the potential liability of the local counsel for the
malpractice of the nonresident counsel. Thus, local counsel will either
t Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A. 1968, University of San Francisco;
J.D. 1971, University of Chicago.
I "For this turn; for this one particular occasion." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1091 (5th
ed. 1979).
2 FED. R. CIv. P. 83 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) authorize federal district courts to
promulgate local rules of practice. For a discussion of local rulemaking authority of the fed-
eral district courts, see 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 3151-3155 (1973).
3 For a description of state interests in statepro hac vice cases, see Brown v. Wood, 257
Ark. 252, 516 S.W.2d 98 (1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
4 .See generaly Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multirtate Practice of Law, 50 WAsH. L. REV.
699 (1975); Note, Attornys: Interstate and Federal Practice,. 80 HARV. L REv. 1711 (1967).
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have to increase fees in proportion to the risk and become more actively
involved in the lawsuit or altogether refuse to assume the role of the
local counsel.
Until some reform is made, local counsel should be careful to delin-
eate precisely his responsibilities in order to avoid liability for the mal-
practice of nonresident counsel. Local counsel may not even be allowed
this precaution in jurisdictions that require local counsel to have full
authority to act for the client. Nor may local counsel contract away
those responsibilities made mandatory by local rule.
This Article first examines the association rules, their justifications,
and the responsibilities they place on local counsel. Second, the focus
turns to lawyer malpractice to alert associated counsel of the potential
risks in assuming the associated counsel role. This material indicates
that it is now realistic to assume that rejection of the local association
rules will be supported by the practicing bar. Finally, this Article pro-
poses that the solution to the problems engendered by the local associa-
tion rules is to eliminate the local association rules entirely and
substitute a uniform federal statute that allows federal courts to require
the association of local counsel only in exceptional circumstances. Such
change should not wait for the resolution of the general issue of admis-
sion to federal practice. In fact, the proposed limitation on association
of local counsel would encourage interdistrict legal practices and might
serve as a limited experiment to help resolve the current controversy
regarding the desirability of national standards for admission to the fed-
eral bar.5
I
RULEMAKING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Under federal statute6 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7
each federal district court is authorized to promulgate local practice
rules that are not inconsistent with constitutional protections, statutory
requirements, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Using this grant
5 This Article will not deal with what constitutes practice of law for state bar activities.
For a discussion of what constitutes allowable legal activity within a state by nonresident
counsel when not directly preparing for litigation, see Note, supra note 4, at 1717-21.
6 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) states: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such
rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed
by the Supreme Court."
7 FsD. R. Civ. P. 83 states:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district
court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may
regulate their practice not inconsistent with these rules.
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of power, district courts have prescribed local rules governing significant
matters such as providing for less than a twelve person jury8 as well as
mundane matters such as the hours during which the public will be ad-
mitted to the court's library.9 Although one commentator praises the
present rulemaking process for formalizing what otherwise would be in-
formal and often inconsistent procedures, 10 others condemn the current
process as inconsistent with the intent of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure." Few appellate decisions have addressed the proper scope of
rulemaking in the federal district courts.
12
Rule 83's requirement that rules be adopted by "action of a major-
ity of the judges" of a district court is the only limitation upon the
method of adopting local rules.1 3 Consequently, it is hard to define the
precise role local bar associations and local lawyers play in the local
rulemaking process. Some courts solicit formal views of the bar and in-
dividual lawyers, 14 whereas other courts do not involve the practicing
bar in the adoption or amendment of local rules. 15 Irrespective of the
lawyers' role in the rulemaking process, however, the ultimate decision
as to the content of local rules remains with the individual courts. 16
A. Descirption of the Local Association Rules
Although the great majority of federal district courts require non-
resident counsel to associate local counsel, 17 the content of the local asso-
ciation rules reflects little uniformity among the courts. Some district
courts make association of local counsel mandatory;18 other courts allow
8 See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
9 N.D. CAL. R. 116-1.
10 Flanders, Zn Praire of Local Rules, 62 JuD. 28 (1978).
11 12 C. WRGIr & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 3152 (draftsmen intended rule 83 to be
used sparingly; proliferation of local rules seriously compromise the strong interest in develop-
ing uniform federal procedure).
12 Eg., McCargo v. Hedrick, 454 F.2d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 1976); see Weinstein, Reform of
Federal Court Rulemaking, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 947 (1976) (local pre-trial procedure rule
void as inconsistent with FED. R. Crv. P. 16; "local rules are not a source of power but are
instead a manifestation of it").
13 FED. R. CIv. P. 83.
14 For a discussion of the experience of the Eastern District of New York, see Weinstein,
supra note 12, at 953-56.
15 See id. at 952-53.
16 For a careful review of the details of an acceptable rulemaking procedure, see J.
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 117-45 (1977). See also E.
CLEARY & R. MISNER, PRELimiNARY REPORT: UNIFORM LocAL RULEs FOR UNITED
STATES Dismar COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRcUIrr 35-37 (1979).
17 Most federal district courts have association rules that require participation by local
counsel or, at the least, require a local member of the bar to move for admission of counselfiro
hac vce. The District of Columbia appears to be the only district court without an association
or motion rule. D.D.C.R. tit. IV.
18 See S.D. ALA. R. I(E); D. DEL. R. 8.1(D); N.D. FLA. R. 5(D); D. HAwAn R. (e); D.
IDAHO R. 2(d); C.D. ILL. R. 1(e); D. KAN. R. 4(0; W.D. Ky. R 2(d); M.D. LA. R. 1(E);
D.N.H.R. 5(b); N.D.N.Y.R. 3; N.D. OHIO R. 2.03; D. OR. R. 3(c); M.D. PA. R. 205; W.D. PA.
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the judge either to dispense with the requirement19 or to use his discre-
tion in determining whether to order local association in the first in-
stance.20 Some courts require association if the nonlocal attorney does
not reside within the federal district,2 1 but most courts require associa-
tion only if the attorney is not a resident of the state in which the federal
court is situated. 22 A few courts, however, do not require association if
the nonlocal counsel is from a "contiguous" area23 or if "out-of-state
counsel. . . come[s] from a jurisdiction that does not require the associ-
ation of local counsel in its courts. '2
4
The responsibilities of local counsel vary greatly from district to dis-
trict. The rules tend to fall into five descriptive categories with varying
degrees of responsibility placed upon local counsel.25 In the first group,
for example, local counsel's responsibilities are seemingly menial; often,
local counsel is intended to be little more than a mail-drop. 26 In the
Northern District of Ohio, for instance, a nonresident attorney must des-
ignate an attorney "admitted in this district and with an office in this
district to or upon whom all notices, rulings, and communications are to
be addressed or served."' 27 Even where local counsel is assigned signifi-
cant responsibility in the case, he often has the added responsibility of
forwarding all correspondence to the nonlocal counsel.28 In the Central
District of Illinois, a "resident agent," rather than a local attorney, may
accept service of process. 29 In the Western District of North Carolina,
nonresident counsel must accept a deputy court clerk as agent for service
R. l(e); D.P.R.R. 4(C); D.R.I.R. 5(a)(2); D.S.C. In the Matter ofAdmissions and Dirbarment of
Attomys 4; E.D. TENN. R. 2(a); M.D. TENN. R. I(h)(1).
19 See E.D. ARu. R. 2(d); W.D. AK. R. 2(d); D. COLO. R. l(b); M.D. FLA. R.
2.02(a)(1); E.D. LA. R. 21.6; W.D. Mo. R. 1(f); D. NEB. R. 5(G); N.D.R. 2(d); N.D. Tax. R.
13.4; S.D. TEX. R. 1(F).
20 See N.D. FLA. R. 5(D); N.D. GA. R. 71.41; S.D. GA. R. 19.41; W.D.N.C.R. I(B); E.D.
Wis. R. 2.04.
21 See S.D. FLA. R. 16(D)(7); N.D. GA. R. 71.41; N.D. IND. R. 1(a); W.D. LA. R. 4; W.D.
PA. R. 1(e); W.D. TENN. R. l(b); N.D. TEx. R. 13.3; S.D. TFx R. I(F); W.D. TEx. R. 4.
22 See C.D. CAL. R. 1.3(a); N.D. IOWA R. 5(F); S.D. IOWA R. 5(f); D. KAN. R. 4(0; W.D.
Ky. R. 4b); E.D. MICH. R. 12(d); E.D.N.C.R. 2.03(a), 2.05; W.D.N.Y.R. 3(A); E.D. PA. R.
13; E.D. VA. R. 7(D); E.D. WASH. R. 1(c).
23 See S.D. ALA. LOCAL R. l(A)(iii); E.D. ARK. R. 2(d); W.D. AR. R. 2(d); D.D.C.R. 4-
1(a); W.D.N.C.R. 1(A).
24 E.D. OKLA. R. 4(h).
25 As with all categorizations, some elements may defy an exact fit and some groups may
tend to overlap, but the groupings are valuable to show in general form how district courts
approach local counsel rules.
26 See N.D. FLA. R. 5(D); M.D. FLA. R. 2.02(a)(1); N.D. GA. R. 71.41; S.D. GA. R. 19.41;
C.D. ILL. R. l(e); W.D. Ky. R. 2(d); W.D. LA. R.'4; W.D. Mo. R. 1(f); D.N.H.R. 5(b);
D.N.J.R. 4(C); S.D.N.Y.R. 3(a); M.D.N.C.R. 2(d)(1); N.D.R. 2(d)(1); N.D. OHIO R. 2.03;
E.D. PA. R. 13(a); W.D. PA. R. 1(e); E.D. TENN. R. 2; M.D. TENN. R. 1(h(1)); W.D. TEx. R.
4.
27 N.D. OHIO R. 2.03.
28 See, e.g., D.N.J.R. 4(C).
29 C.D. IL-. R. I(e).
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of process.30 Another common type of local rule that appears to give
local counsel only menial responsibilities requires only that local counsel
sponsor a nonresident attorney before the court or move for the admis-
sion of the nonresident attorney.3 '
In the second group of jurisdictions, local counsel plays a more ac-
tive, responsible role in the pending litigation. The most common re-
quirement is that a nonresident attorney "designate. . .a member of
the bar of this Court who maintains an office at the place within the
district . . .with whom the Court and opposing counsel may readily
communicate regarding the conduct of the case."'3 2 The "readily com-
municate" rule is often joined with a requirement that local counsel be
designated an agent for service of process.3 3
In the third group of districts, local counsel plays an even more
prominent role. For example, the Middle District of Louisiana refers to
the nonresident attorney as "co-counsel." 34 In the Southern District of
Ohio, the nonresident counsel "may be permitted to appear and partici-
pate as co-counsel or associate counsel."'3 5 Other districts require that
nonresident counsel be "in association with a member" of the bar of the
court.36 Closely related to the "co-counsel" rules are those that require
local counsel to be "of record. 3 7 Other rules require local counsel to
"appear" in the litigation,3 8 while still others require that a client be
"represented by" !ocal counsel. 39 Some districts require local counsel to
sign all pleadings.40
The fourth group of local rules are more exacting with respect to
the role played by local counsel. Several courts require local counsel to
"meaningfully participate" in the preparation and trial of the case.4 '
Other courts require that local counsel have full authority to act for the
client.42 The District of Nebraska requires that local counsel "have full
30 W.D.N.C.R. I(B).
31 See N.D. MIss. R. G-1(3)(b) & (c).
32 D. AiAsKA R. 3(c)(1); see APrz. R. 6(b); E.D. ARK. R. 2(d); W.D. ARK. R. 2(d); C.D.
CAL. R. 1.3(b)(2); E.D. CAL. R. 9(b)(2); N.D. CAL. R. 110.2(a); S.D. CAL. R. 110-3(d); S.D.
FLA. R. 16(D)(1); D. IDAHO R. 2(d);D.P.R.R. 4(C).
33 See C.D. CAL. R. 1.3(b)(2); E.D. CAL. R. 9(b)(2); N.D. CAL. R. 110(2)(a); S.D. CAL.
R. 110-3(d); S.D. FLA. R. 16(D)(1).
34 M.D. LA. R. 1(E)(2).
35 S.D. OHio R. 3(0)(4).
36 D.R.I.R. 5(b)(2).
37 See N.D. IND. R. 1(d); S.D. IND. R. 1(d); D. MD. R. 3; D.N.J.R. 4(C); E.D. PA. R.
13(a); D.S.C. In the Mater ofAdrnsion andDisbamrent ofAtomMYs 4; E.D. TENN. R. 2(a); E.D.
VA. R. 7(d); W.D. VA. ATroRNEYs (4).
38 Se, e.g., W.D. Wis. R. 1(d).
39 See, e.g., M.D.N.C.R. 2(d)(1).
40 See D. KAN. R. 4(0; W.D. Mo. R. 7(0; D.R.I.R. 5(b)(3); S.D.W. VA. R. 1.05(c).
41 See D. HAWAn R. 1(e); D. OR. R. 3(c); E.D. WASH. R. 1(c).
42 See D. MoNT. . 1(c); N.D. Tax. R. 13.4; D. UTAH R. 1(c); E.D. VA. R. 7(D); W.D.
VA. Peastice of Non-Rekdnt Attoneys (4).
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authority to act for and on behalf of the client in all matters, including
pre-trial conferences, as well as trial or any other hearings." 43 The Dis-
trict of Alaska rule states that "[l]ocal counsel shall be primarily respon-
sible to the Court for the conduct of all stages of the proceedings, and
their authority shall be superior to that of [nonresident] attorneys." 44
Other court rules grant local counsel full authority to act on behalf of
the client if nonresident counsel is unavailable.45
The fifth group of rules gives the judge the discretion to determine
local counsel's responsibilities. 46 In the District of Nevada, for example,
"the court may, in a particular case, at any time, order such nonresident
attorney to associate a resident attorney as co-counsel in the case and the
court may specify their respective responsibilities to the case." 47
The lack of uniformity among the districts as to who may practice
in the federal court and as to the role of local counsel is probably even
greater in practice than the local rules might indicate. Many local court
rules contain waiver provisions.48 Thus, judges may not apply the asso-
ciation rules in a uniform manner.49 The problem is compounded by
the fact that a decision to waive a rule often does not require written
justification and is virtually unreviewed.50 Even in those districts in
which association of local counsel is apparently mandatory, it is likely
that individual judges do not uniformly require such association.
Judges often choose to ignore certain rules despite rule 83's formal
rulemaking requirements. 5' Indeed, most federal courts admit in prac-
tice what the Southern District of Alabama has admitted in its rules-
that individual judges may well have their own particular rules of
procedure. 52
B. Jusifations for Local Association Rules
1. Compeeng, of Counsel
Local association rules are often justified on the basis that they pro-
43 D. NEB. R. 5(G).
44 D. ALASKA R. 3(c)(3).
45 e, e.g., E.D. MICH. R. 12(d).
46 e E.D. LA. R. 21.5; D. NEv. R. 4(e)(4); D. UTAH R. l(c).
47 D. Nsv. R. 4(e)(4).
48 ee note 19 supra.
49 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979), recognized that the
broad discretion exercised by state trial judges in deciding whether to allow appearances by
nonresident lawyers could curtail the reasonable expectations and valid constitutional inter-
ests of the parties involved. Justice Stevens would require that the trial judge's discretion be
exercised only on the basis of "permissible reasons" and that procedural safeguards be pro-
vided to ensure that the affected parties have an opportunity to reason with the judge. Id. at
453-56.
50 See generaly 12 C. WiuGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 3152.
51 See Note, Rule 83 and the Local FederalRules, 67 COLUM. L. RaV. 1251, 1264-65 (1967).
52 S.D. ALA. R. 20.
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tect unwary clients from attorneys who are ignorant of the "substantive
and procedural law and professional traditions peculiar" to the local
court.53 The rules imply that local counsel are knowledgeable in these
matters. More broadly, the justification casts the local rules in the role
of protecting high, local professional standards.54 In the federal court
context, such justification is dubious.55
Historically, the general lack of access to court rules and decisions
in other jurisdictions, the lack of quick transportation and communica-
tion, and the lack of rigorous standards for admission to the bar justified
state pro hac vice rules requiring nonresident counsel to associate local
counsel in state court proceedings. 56 Today, it is within the prerogative
of state bar associations to require association of local counsel given the
idiosyncracies of state law practice.5 7 Similarly, before the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one might have been able to jus-
tify a narrowpro hac vice rule for local association in federal court in view
of the federal judiciary's deference to local procedures.5 8 Current federal
practice, however, with "federalized" substantive law and "federalized"
procedural law, substantially undermines the competency
justification.59
Despite the nonresident lawyer's ready access to local district court
rules and to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ° proponents of local
association rules still claim that local counsel is needed to inform nonres-
ident counsel "how it is done around here." This attitude stems from
two possible sources: the abuse of rulemaking authority and the need to
inform nonresident counsel of the idiosyncracies of a particular district
court judge.
53 M. PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, PROFEssIONAL RE PONSmLITY 149 (3d ed. 1976).
54 "Only the lawyer with considerable experience in a particular forum can adequately
and consistently render high-level service in the area of local procedure." Martin v. Davis,
187 Kan. 473, 485, 357 P.2d 782, 792 (1960), appeal dismissedsub nom Martin v. Walton, 368
U.S. 25, 27-28 (1961) (dismissed per curiam for want of substantial federal question, but cited
with approval).
55 For a discussion of the mobility of lawyers in today's practice, see Spanos v. Skouras
Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1966); 9 CONN. L. Rav. 136, 138 (1976).
56 The standards regulating pro hac vice appearances, like most of the policies
which first governed qualification for and conduct of the modern legal profes-
sion, were framed when the body of the law was finite and was rife with juris-
dictional peculiarities rooted in local transition. Lawyers everywhere were
generalists. Transportation was largely by horse and buggy. Communication
was by slow-delivery letter or personal messenger.
Pro Hac Vice in the Modem World, 106 N.J.L.J. 168 (1980).
57 Se Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 480, 357 P.2d 782, 788 (1960), appeal dimissed sub
nom Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961).
58 For a discussion of the "conformity" doctrine, see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 61 (3d ed. 1976).
59 But see Brakel & Loh, sufia note 4, at 718-19.
60 All federal district and circuit court rules can be found in looseleaf service. See FED-
ERAL LOCAL COURT RULEs FOR CIvIL AND ADMIRALTY PROCEEDINGS (Callaghan & Co.
1979).
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A court may abuse the rulemaking authority conferred by rule 83
by failing to adopt new rules when old rules are clearly outdated or
uninstructive,61 by making rules or modifying printed rules through
"standing orders" not readily available to nonresident counsel,62 or by
allowing important substantive deviations from local rule by individual
judges.63 The abuse of the rulemaking authority suggests a need for
stricter adherence to rulemaking responsibilities on the part of federal
courts, rather than a need for the association of local counsel as a means
of compensating for the defects in the local rules.
Information about the idiosyncracies of a particular district court
judge generally is passed on by word of mouth.64 If the peculiarities of
the judge concern only the demeanor of lawyers and "traffic patterns"
in the courtroom, the requirement of retaining associated counsel is
hardly justified. If the peculiarities concern more substantive matters,
however, such as the mechanics of voir dire, the method of exercising
peremptory challenges, 65 limitations on the number of interrogatories, 66
and the like, the judge can publicize these "rules" through pre-trial con-
ferences or through printed directions supplementing the local rules.67
If the procedure is so important as to require a separate publication,
however, the court should make the procedure part of the district court
rules so that it will be uniform throughout the district.68 District court
rules were never intended to be a practice manual, but the rules should
contain those procedures that could affect the outcome of litigation in
the district.69
Often unstated in the discussion of the need for local associated
61 For example, the Central District of California is currently revising rules originally
adopted in 1967, because the old rules do not reflect the way the court now operates.
62 The Central District of California has approximately 181 "standing orders" covering
topics as diverse as court security and the speedy disposition of criminal cases. See Flanders,
supra note 5, at 36.
63 Although the 1967 Rules state the page size, type size, and other technical require-
ments of filed papers, many judges in the Central District of California ignore these rules and
make their own technical demands.
64 In 1972-73, a survey of 392 federal court judges was conducted on the topic of admis-
sion and discipline of attorneys in the federal district courts. In regard to the need for local
counsel to protect high local professional standards, 198 judges stated that local counsel was
needed because of "familiarity with local law and custom," yet the great majority of judges
admitted that neither in regular admission nor in ro hac vice admissions did the court ex-
amine the attorney "with respect to knowledge of or familiarity with general or local rules."
Agata, Admissions and Disczfline ofAttonrzys in Federal District Courts: A Study and Prop osed Rules, 3
HoFsTRA L. Rav. 249, 376 (1975).
65 See, e.g., D. Asiz. R. 45.
66 Although limitations on interrogatories are not contained in the local rules, Judge
James M. Burns of the District of Oregon has, for many years, limited the number of interrog-
atories allowed to be served on a party to 25.
67 See E. CLEARY & R. MIsFit, supra note 16, at 3-210.
68 See generallv Flanders, supra note 10.
69 Id.
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counsel is the judicial preference for local attorneys. Judges may feel
that local attorneys, who will appear in the local federal court time and
time again, will be more "respectful" to the local federal judges.70 As a
result, local counsel will not press a client's claim beyond the "edge of
propriety." Taken to an extreme, however, such a submission on the
part of counsel to pressure from the court can lead to a failure to prose-
cute the interests of the client "zealously." 7'
Despite assumptions to the contrary, local counsel is not necessarily
more knowledgeable of applicable local law than nonresident counsel.
Most districts require that local associated counsel be admitted to the
state bar and reside in either the district or state.72 Admission to the
state bar, however, does not reflect any particular expertise in federal
practice, nor does mere residence guarantee knowledge.73 In addition,
one state bar is unlikely to require more knowledge of federal practice as
a prerequisite to state admission than will the bar of any other state.
Thus, local counsel will have no inherent advantage over nonresident
counsel in general knowledge of federal practice. No federal court re-
quires local counsel to have any greater degree of federal court practice
expertise.7 4 In fact, nonresident counsel's expertise in federal practice
and federal substantive law is probably the reason the client retained
him in the first place.75
From a broader perspective, it is unclear that a federal district
court has a strong interest in protecting clients from their own choice of
counsel. The tradition of the bar dictates that the client have un-
restricted choice of counsel. 76 Criminal penalties for barratry77 and
bans on lawyer advertising78 are expressions of this policy. It is curious
70 See note 64 supra.
71 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7.
72 See notes 10-11 sufra.
73 See Brakel & Loh, sufra note 4, at 718-19.
74 In Report and Tentative Recommendations of the Committee to Consder Standardsfor Admission
to Practice in the Federal Courts, 85 F.R.D. 155, 213 (1979), the Devitt Committee recommended
that
as a condition precedent to practice in the United States Courts an applicant
must pass a written examination on at least the following subjects: Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Rules of Evidence, Federal Jurisdiction and the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
For a discussion of admission requirements for district courts in the Second Circuit, see New
Admission Rules Proposedfor Federal Distict Courts, 61 A.B.A.J. 1091, 1093 (1975).
75 &e Brakel & Loh, supira note 4, at 730 for a description of one small aspect of the use
of nonresident counsel-ie., corporate house counsel.
76 The right to have counsel of one's choice in state courts, however, does not mean that
one has a right to be represented by an attorney who is not a member of the state bar. Cf.
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (attorney's fourteenth amendment rights not violated by
local association rules).
77 See R. PmuKNs, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 523-38 (2d ed. 1969).
78 For a discussion of lawyer advertising before and after Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
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that the legal tradition should retreat from its preference for client-cho-
sen counsel in the pro hac vice situation.
Most courts do not require or apparently do not make an inquiry
into the client's motives for selecting nonresident counsel. These courts
honor the client's choice, so long as the client retains additional local
counsel. Some local court rules, however, do require a client to have a
substantial reason for choosing nonresident counsel as a precondition to
permitting the nonresident counsel to pradtice pro hac vice. 79 The sub-
stantial reason requirement is somewhat ironic in a legal system that has
made free choice of counsel by the client a hallmark.
It could be argued that the importance of the court's interest in
protecting clients from unknowledgeable counsel depends upon where
the client resides. If the client is an out-of-state client with out-of-state
counsel, the burden of protection of the client from the unknowledge-
able or unscrupulous attorney would seem to fall upon the out-of-state
bar.80 If the client is an in-state client with an out-of-state counsel, the
court must realize that the client's choice is probably a corporate deci-
sion or one based on the advice and recommendation of local counsel.81
Neither situation justifies the court's adoption of rules intended to police
the client's choice.
The competency-of-counsel rationale has broader implications as
well. The court may feel an obligation to disassociate itself from the
possibility of reaching a decision affected by the poor performance of
foreign counsel. In this situation, the justification for local association
turns from client-centered interests to a court-centered interest-the in-
tegrity of the federal judicial system. Although protecting the integrity
350 (1977), see Meyer & Smith, Attorney Advertising: Bates and a Beginning, 20 Aiuz. L. REv.
427 (1978).
79 See, e.g., W.D. WASH. G.R. 2(d). For a similar requirement in a state jurisdiction, see
State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d 225 (1968). Clients may choose nonresident counsel
for the following reasons:
(a) the need for the assistance of a specialist not available in the local state;
(b) the inability to obtain counsel in the local state because oflocal prejudice
or bias;
(c) the need of large organizations engaged in multistate activities to have
their own counsel and represent their interests in the several states. Local
counsel are unlikely to have the same competence with respect to the special
problems of the organization.
(d) a single legal problem may have multistate ramifications and is best dealt
with by a single counsel.
M. PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, supra note 53, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
80 Kalish, Pro Ha Vice Admission: A Proposal, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 367 (1979). Professor
Kalish, discussing state court ro hac v'ce admissions, sees very little interest for the trial court
in protecting nonresident clients from their choice of nonresident counsel. Professor Kalish
frames the issue in terms of a balance between the client's view of what is good for him and
the trial court's view of what is good for the client. In most cases, he contends, the harm to
the client in denying the pro hae vice petition outweighs any overall beneficial effects from
allowing the trial court to police the client/counsel relationship. Id. at 392.
81 Id.
[Vol. 67:345
LOCAL ASSOCIATED COUNSEL
of the decisionmaking process is a noble consideration, current local as-
sociation rules do little to forward the goal of judicial integrity.
Nor do the present rules serve to maintain the high, local profes-
sional standards of practice and thereby to protect the unwary client.
Clearly, district court rules merely requiring local counsel to be a "mail-
drop '8 2 do not protect local standards. Local standards can be pro-
tected only if local counsel is an active "watchdog" in the litigation and
if local counsel standards are truly higher than those of nonlocal coun-
sel. In those districts that lie in multi-district states and which require
local counsel to reside within the district,8 3 there can be no justifiable
claim that protection of standards is at issue. Arguably, the only meas-
ure of competency of counsel is through the admissions process of the
state bar; there is no reason to believe that counsel residing in-district
are more competent than members of the same state bar residing outside
the district. Similarly, in districts that admit out-of-state counsel from
"contiguous areas" 84 and in districts that admit counsel on a reciprocal
basis with other districts, 5 no attempt is made to assess the professional
standards in nonresident counsel's home district. If the association rule
is intended to protect local standards, one would expect the association
rule explicitly to permit waiver of the rule when the court is satisfied as
to the competency of nonlocal counsel.8 6 The association rule assumes
that the level of competency of nonlocal counsel is lower than that of
local counsel. When one considers the client's reasons for choosing non-
local counsel,8 7 this is a dubious assumption.
Even if one accepts the proposition that federal district courts can
and should use the local association rule to protect high, local profes-
sional standards, the active involvement of local counsel is necessary to
achieve such a result. It is unclear whether local counsel has actually
played that role in the past, and, given their potential malpractice liabil-
ity, it is doubtful that local counsel will be willing to play such a role in
the future.
2. Ethical Conduct of Counsel
Courtsa and commentators 9 often invoke considerations of profes-
82 See note 26 supra.
83 See note 21 sufra.
84 See note 23 sura.
85 See, e.g., N.D. FiA. R. 5(D). For a discussion of reciprocity in state bar admissions, see
Kalish, supra note 80, at 399-402 (contending that reciprocity rules protect neither litigants
nor integrity of the local system, but instead reflect economic concerns of the local bar).
86 In those districts that permit waiver of associated local counsel, see note 19 .supra, the
court may consider attorney competency in deciding to waive the association requirement.
87 See note 79 sura.
88 See, e.g., McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 344, 500 S.W.2d 357, 366 (1973).
89 See Brakel & Loh, supra note 4, at 705. Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counse" The Evolu-
tlion of a Federal Right, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 731 (1967).
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sional ethics and discipline to justify rules governing pro hac vice admis-
sion. Frequently, these justifications are cavalierly carried over as
justifications for requiring local counsel. A state court's statement in
McKenzie v. Buris90 is typical:
The state has legitimate interests to be weighed in considering pro hac
vice admissions in order to maintain a high level of professional ethics,
[and] to assure a high quality of representation in the courts. . . . In
order to properly protect these interests and to expedite the adminis-
tration ofjustice, the courts are concerned with the qualifications and
conduct of counsel, their availability for service of papers and amena-
bility to disciplinary proceedings.91
Arguably, a local federal court has a valid concern if the state bar of
which nonresident counsel is a member is less active in regulating attor-
ney conduct than is the local bar. In this situation, it is possible that the
nonresident's bar has failed to document prior unethical conduct and
that the federal court will be unaware of the counsel's prior pattern of
behavior.
It is difficult to justify requiring nonresident counsel to associate
local counsel on the theory that association will result in more ethical
conduct on the part of nonresident counsel. Courts do not promulgate
local rules with the explicit intent that local counsel control the unethi-
cal conduct of nonresident counsel. If such were the case, control of
nonresident counsel's conduct would necessitate a very active role on the
part of local counsel in order to monitor nonresident counsel's conduct
or to influence nonresident counsel's method of practice. The monitor-
ing role is destructive of both the lawyer-client relationship and the law-
yer-lawyer relationship. The leadership by example argument is naive
at best.
Closely allied to the concern for ethical behavior is the issue of dis-
ciplinary proceedings. Proponents of local association rules argue that
local counsel is necessary to control nonresident counsel because the dis-
trict court may be without disciplinary measures against nonresident
counsel. There is no reason, however, why a local federal district court
cannot discipline any lawyer who chooses to practice before it.92 The
federal court could readily assume jurisdiction over the nonresident
counsel.93 In addition to normal disciplinary measures, the federal court
90 255 Ark. 330, 500 S.W.2d 357 (1973).
91 Id. at 344, 500 S.W.2d at 366.
92 A few district courts require that nonresident counsel agree to confer disciplinary ju-
risdiction upon the court as a condition of admission pro hae vice. See, e.g., D.D.C.R. 4-3
(VIII). For a discussion of disciplinary jurisdiction in the statepro hac vtice situation, see Peo-
ple v. Bruinsma, 34 Mich. App. 167, 177-78, 191 N.W.2d 108, 112-13 (1971).
93 See Brakel & Loh, supra note 4, at 705-06; Comment, The Local Rules of CivilProcedure in
The Federal Disrict Courts-A Suvy, 1966 DuKE LJ. 1011, 1018; Note, The Prantlce of Law hy
[Vol. 67:345
LOCAL ASSOCIATED COUNSEL
could use its contempt power to fine or imprison,94 its statutory author-
ity to impose costs in certain instances,95 and its authority under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to discipline the attorney.9 6 At a mini-
mum, the court could report any incidents of unethical conduct to the
federal district court and the state bar association in the nonresident
counsel's home state. Even if discipline of nonresident counsel were a
serious problem,9 7 requiring association of local counsel effects no rem-
edy; the presence of local counsel does nothing to enhance a local federal
district court's authority over nonresident counsel.
3. Availability of Counsel
The third justification offered by proponents of local association is
that local association rules ensure the availability of some counsel for
service of process, hearings, and other court activity.98 In light of mod-
ern methods of communication, as well as the added expenses of associa-
tion, this justification loses force.
Having local counsel available to receive service of process is a mat-
tei solely of convenience, but proponents of association mistakenly com-
plicate the issue with problems of jurisdiction. There is no jurisdictional
reason why papers cannot be "served" on nonlocal counsel by mail or
other delivery systems.99 Jurisdictional questions do not relate to the
locus of counsel but depend upon the locus or contacts of the party.
Out-of-Sate Attorneys, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1276, 1285 (1967). For a discussion of the problems of
disciplining nonresident counsel in state pro hae vice situations, see id. at 1285.
94 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (Supp. III 1979) (fines against
attorneys who violate certain provisions of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974).
95 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980); see Note, Sanctios Imposed by Courts on Altorneys Who Abuse the
judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 619, 623 (1977).
96 FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
97 Attorney discipline in the federal district courts is not of great practical significance.
See Agata, supira note 64, at 384-88. Rarely does a federal court need to discipline a lawyer as
a result of conduct exhibited during federal proceedings. The majority of disciplinary actions
involving federal courts are profonna suspensions of the right to practice in federal court after
counsel has been disciplined by the state bar for a state matter. Id. at 283. In theseproforma
situations, most federal courts rely on findings of the state bar associations in their discipli-
nary proceedings and rarely investigate matters in the first instance. As a practical matter, if
nonresident counsel's conduct in federal court requires an investigation, the district court can
use its own mechanism to investigate the activity or ask the state bar to serve as its arm of
investigation. Id. at 283-88.
Although some well-publicized instances of questionable conduct by nonresident counsel
may have exaggerated the problem, see, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); In re Belli, 371 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1974); In re
Bailey, 57 N.J. 451, 273 A.2d 563 (1971), discipline of nonlocal counsel is not a recurring
problem and surely does not justify a local association requirement.
98 See Brasierv.Jeary, 256F.2d474,476 (8th Cir. 1958); Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473,
482-83, 357 P.2d 782, 790 (1960), apeal dismissed sub nom. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25
(1961).
99 One of the most interesting tables in the survey of federal judges, see Agata, sufra note
64, at 381, shows that the largest single response to the need for local counsel was for purposes
of service of papers.
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Although the local counsel may be an agent of the client for service of
process, his role as agent is for the court's convenience1° and is not
meant to confer jurisdiction.
The need for the court and counsel to confer on discovery matters
and hearing dates is a real one, but it can be served just as easily
through alternative methods such as the conference call. Surely, the
need to communicate on certain matters does not justify burdening the
client with the added expense of associating local counsel. Those courts
that require local counsel to "readily communicate"101 with the court or
opposing counsel in the management of the case force local counsel
either to actively participate in all aspects of the case or to delay re-
sponding to an inquiry until he has consulted with nonlocal counsel.
The court or opposing counsel could more efficiently and more effec-
tively deal directly with nonlocal counsel. Thus, the proferred commu-
nicative function of local counsel fails to justify the association
requirement.
The availability of counsel for scheduled or emergency appearances
before the court is the most cogent reason for requiring the association of
local counsel. 10 2 Nonetheless, a blanket rule requiring association in
every case is overkill. Few cases progress past the discovery stage; there-
fore, it seems wasteful to require local counsel in all cases fled. Even in
those cases that continue to litigation, proper case management should
enable nonresident counsel to anticipate necessary appearances with suf-
ficient precision to allow all counsel to plan their schedules accordingly.
In the rare, genuine emergency, nonlocal counsel could argue via tele-
phone. There may be rare cases where the need for quick, unscheduled
appearances is so great that close-by counsel is necessary, but the client
is always free to associate local counsel if the litigation warrants
association.
Some courts ensure immediate personal access to counsel by requir-
ing local counsel to have authority to act in all matters for the client
when nonlocal counsel is unavailable. 10 3 This solution necessitates an
active local counsel, totally familiar with the current status of the case.
100 The local association requirement, in fact, may not even merit the "convenience"
justification. Sending papers to local counsel, who must then forward them to the nonresi-
dent counsel, actually increases the chance that the papers will be lost and proceedings
delayed. Cf. Baez v. S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
904 (1976) (Papers were served on defendant's local registered agent, who mailed them to the
defendant's home office. The papers were lost in the mail and the court entered a default
judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to withdraw the default
judgment.).
101 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
102 See Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960), appealdismissed.rub noa. Mar-
tin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961).
103 See note 42 supra.
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Considering that local counsel rarely will be called upon to act in place
of nonresident counsel, the result is needless duplication of effort.
Nonlocal counsel may, indeed, be more difficult to contact and con-
fer with than local counsel, but this problem had its genesis in days of
limited communication and travel. A more open rule can easily make
exceptions for cases in which transportation difficulties are crucial. x0 4
Only the Southern District of Texas has addressed the problem of un-
availability with any creativity:
An attorney who does not reside or maintain an office in this District
but wishes to become the attorney in charge for such a party may
request that the Judge designate him as such by submitting a motion
* . .agreeing to be available to appear for hearings on 48 hours' no-
tice and to accept collect long distance telephone calls from the Court
or opposing counsel for purposes reasonably calculated to advance the
case.
I05
The courts could reasonably serve client-centered concerns relating
to appearance of counsel. If a client chooses not to associate local coun-
sel, the court should explain to the client that he will incur additional
expenses for delivery of papers, long distance calls, and the like. Re-
turning the choice of association to the client could allow courts to re-
quire the client to bear responsibility if the action is not timely
prosecuted as a result of the unavailability of nonresident counsel. In
the past, courts have been unwilling to dismiss with prejudice cases for
lack of prosecution by counsel, 10 6 but courts should be less reluctant to
do so if the risk of dismissal is one the client freely assumes in choosing
nonresident counsel.
4. Economic Protection of the Local Bar
The Supreme Court has recognized that traditional limitations on
the practice of law can have serious anticompetitive effects.'0 7 Local
association requirements may have similar anticompetitive effects.' 08 In-
104 For example, in Aronson v. Ambrose, 479 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1973), the court recognized
that "as a practical matter the Virgin Islands may be reached from the mainland only by
travel on limited and, frequently, congested airlines." Consequently, the Third Circuit up-
held the rule of the District Court of the Virgin Islands requiring all members of the Virgin
Islands bar to live and practice in the Virgin Islands. Id. at 78.
105 S.D. Tax. R. 1(D)(3).
106 See, e.g., Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co., 335 F.2d 551 (1964). Compare id.
with Rosenberg v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Misc. 2d 554, 416 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct.
1979).
107 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1976) (removing the ban on advertising
by lawyers); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-84 (1975) (striking down pub-
lished fee schedules).
108 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 93, at 1019; Note, stra note 4, at 1711; Note, Earing
Multistate Prartice Restrictions-"Good Cause" Based Limited Admission, 29 RuTERs L. REy.
1182, 1203-09 (1976).
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deed, many observers contend that local association rules exist primarily
to benefit the local bar economically at the client's expense. 0 9
Commentators who have considered pro hac vice admissions in state
court recognize the anticompetitive advantages local counsel derive
from state restrictions on nonresident counsel. The discussion usually
centers on whether protection of local counsel is a legitimate state inter-
est 10 and on the various constitutional theories upon which restrictions
on local practice might be challenged."' In order to determine the le-
gitimacy of state interests in the area of state pro hac vice admission prac-
tices, one must balance the policy of federalism 1 2 and federally
protected liberty interests" 3 against the privileges and immunity
clause," 4 the right to interstate travel, 115 and other constitutional theo-
ries. 116 The controversy over and merits of state regulation of local prac-
tice is only tangentially applicable to the federal court association rules,
because interests of federalism are not present where federal courts are
involved."17
Some local federal rules are blatantly protectionist. For example,
the Eastern District of Louisiana requires associated counsel except
where the rule would cause "hardship" to the litigant." 8 The Western
District of North Carolina does not require associated counsel "where
the amount in controversy. . . does not appear to justify double em-
ployment of counsel."'' 9 The New Jersey District Court limits the
number of appearances a lawyer may make pro hac vice.120 Such rules
109 See note 108 supra. But see Comment, Leis v. Flynt: Retaining a Nonresident Attornq for
Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 572, 587 (1979) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he state has an interest in restraining competition among attorneys. By
limiting the number of lawyers it permits to practice, the state preserves "a
viable bar committed to the local community," while perhaps reducing
financial pressures that may lead to misconduct. Extensive practice by non-
residents may be thought to endanger the livelihood of the local bar and may
limit local lawyers' ability to gain expertise in certain types of litigation.
110 See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 57, at 394-99.
111 See 19 STAN. L. REv. 856 (1967).
112 See, e.g., Brown v. Supreme Court of Va., 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va. 1973).
113 See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979). See also Kalish, supra note 57, at 377-89.
114 See Spanos v. Skourus Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987
(1966). See also 19 STAN. L. REV. 856, 860-63 (1967).
115 More recent cases and commentaries have concluded that the nebulous constitutional
right to travel is not overburdened by state licensing. See Kalish, supra note 57, at 386 n.66.
116 See Comment, Commerce Clause Chamllenge to State Restritions on Practice by Out-of-State
Attoms, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 737 (1978); Note, supra note 69, at 1291.
117 It is clear that the interests of a federal court in admitting a person to practice are
different from the state interests. See Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 47 (1913). In Sperry v.
Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the Court upheld the petitioner's right to practice before the
United States Patent Office even though he was not admitted to practice in the state. See
general/. Note, supra note 89.
118 E.D. LA. R. 21.6.a.
119 W.D.N.C.R. I(B).
120 D.NJ.R. 4(c). The rule is described in Note, EasingMultistate Practice Restrictions, supra
note 108, at 1203 n. 71:
"Rule 4(C) is primarily, however, a disappointing example of local bar eco-
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are clearly intended to protect the local bar and cannot be justified by
competency, professional conduct, or availablity of local counsel. Rules
that require nonlocal counsel to convince the court of their need to ap-
pear in the case have a similar effect. 121 The implication of these rules is
that if competent local counsel are available, there is no reason not to
employ them.' 22
Most simply stated, the purpose of the federal court system is to
encourage the fair and efficient settlement of causes of action that have
federal implications. In discussing state regulation of pro hac vice prac-
tice, the Supreme Court stated that a governing body may not, "by in-
voking the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys,
infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public to be fairly
represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic pub-
nomic protectionism which supports none of the state or federal systems' legit-
imate interests."
The Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 16, Sanders
v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968), discusses Rule 4(C) in the following
manner.
The Clerk of the District of New Jersey informed counsel for petitioners
that the Rule was designed to prevent New York and Philadelphia law-
yers from monopolizing lucrative commercial cases, especially FELA
cases, and was walvable in the kind of case for which there was little
competition among New Jersey lawyers.
In a telephone conversation with Mr. Angelo Locasio, Clerk of the Dis-
trict of New Jersey of Feb. 10, 1976, Mr. Locasio stated that most of the out-
of-state attorneys come from Philadelphia and New York City. The areas of
law generally involved are patent law, negligence law and FELA actions, with
an emphasis on the last two.
The three-time limitation is not defensible in terms of administrative
convenience. The Clerk of the District of New Jersey stated that his office no
longer keeps strict account of the number of 4(C) appearances, for reasons of
administrative convenience. If he or one of his staff recognizes the name of an
attorney or a firm as having appeared in court several times, that attorney or
firm will be contacted. Telephone conversations wtih Mr. Angelo Locasio,
Clerk of District of New Jersey, February 10, 1976 and April 14, 1976.
121 E.D. WASH. R. 1(c); W.D. WASH. G.R. 2(d).
122 Denying the plaintiff's application for the admission of an out-of-state attorney as
trial counselpro hac vice in state court, the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated in Silverman
v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 168 Conn. 160, 179, 363 A.2d 22, 31 (1975):
Based on the conclusive finding of the Superior Court, we cannot -find that it
misread or misconstrued the requirements of § 15A. The rule clearly states
that a showing of "good cause" is a condition precedent to the granting of an
application that "[g]ood cause for according such privilege shall be limited to
facts or circumstances affecting the personal or financial welfare of the client
and not the attorney." While the rule goes on to state that such facts "may
include" the showing of a pre-existing attorney-client relationship or the in-
ability of the litigant to secure the services of Connecticut counsel, we do not
construe the suggestion of these illustrations of relevant facts which permissi-
bly "may" be shown as being exclusive criteria rather than examples of rele-
vant circumstances affecting the personal or financial welfare of the client
which may be proved. Nor do we conclude from the court's finding that it so
misread or misconstrued the rule as to find that these were exclusive criteria
rather than illustrative examples.
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lic interest. 1 23 Thus, even if economic protection of local attorneys is an
acceptable state interest, it is not an interest that should be furthered by
federal courts. 124
C. Responsibilities of Local Counsel Under the Association Rules
Under the various local counsel association rules, the duties of local
counsel generally can be described in one of five ways: as a "mail
drop"; 125 as a person with whom the court and opposing counsel can
"readily communicate"; 126 as "co-counsel"; 12 7 as "co-equal" or "lead"
counsel; 128 and as determined by the court on "case-by-case" basis. 129
The limited case law in the area and the conflicting justifications for the
rules make it virtually impossible to give specific content to these de-
scriptions. This Article will discuss the possible parameters of these du-
ties with particular attention to the liability of local counsel for
malpractice.
Local counsel associated under a "mail-drop" rule ostensibly has no
responsibility other than to receive and forward papers to nonresident
counsel. In such situations, local counsel can clearly determine what his
responsibilities are and whether his fees are commensurate with these
responsibilities. Even in these "mail drop" districts, however, the re-
sponsibilities of local counsel may be more than menial. Consider, for
analogical purposes, those courts that require local counsel to move the
admission of nonresident counsel; 130 moving the admission of nonresi-
dent counsel represents to the court that nonresident counsel meets the
local standards of professional conduct.' 3 ' This "vouching" require-
ment may have a hidden counterpart in the "mail-drop" rules. Despite
the limited wording of the local "mall-drop" rule, a district judge might,
as a matter of discretion, require more active participation on the part
of local counsel by requiring local counsel to be available and ready to
proceed if the nonresident counsel is unavailable. 132 In addition, local
123 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex reZ Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1,
7 (1964). See also Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 1965).
124 " See note 116 supra.
125 See note 26 supra.
126 See note 32 sura.
127 See note 35 supra.
128 See notes 41-45 supra.
129 See note 47 supra.
130 See, e.g., In re Greenberg, 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46 (1954); D. MAss. R. 6(b); W.D.
TENN. R. 1(b).
131 "[V]ouching for out-of-state attorneys in order to enable them to appearpro hac vice in
our courts is not a mere formality, but entails responsibility for the good conduct of such
attorneys according to our standards of professional conduct." In re Greenberg, 15 NJ. 132,
138-39, 104 A.2d 46, 49 (1954) (emphasis in original).
132 Even where admission rules are nebulous or nonexistent, the assumption has always
been that courts have a great deal of discretion in controlling practice before them. See, e.g.,
12 C. WRiGinT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 3153.
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counsel must assume certain responsibilities in order to justify the "mail-
drop" rules as more than an economic windfall for local counsel. In any
event, local counsel may be unable to predict what his unstated duties
are. More important, at a trial for malpractice, local counsel may find it
difficult to convince a jury that he had no duties, only billable hours.
Cautious counsel may well determine, even in the "mail drop" districts,
that the potential risk of liability for the malpractice of nonresident
counsel outweighs the small fee that the status of local counsel might
generate.
. Association rules that require local counsel to be able to "readily
communicate" with the court and opposing counsel must be read to re-
quire that local counsel be knowledgeable about the case on his own
account, and not simply to provide a telephone middleman between the
court and nonresident counsel. At the very least, local counsel should be
authorized to communicate the present status of the case without having
to "check in" with nonresident counsel, and the court or opposing coun-
sel should be able to rely upon this information. Of course, there is no
need to rely on local counsel unless the court or opposing counsel has
unsuccessfully attempted to contact nonresident counsel with an imme-
diate need for information. Even under this extremely limited reading
of "readily communicate," local counsel has significant responsibilities.
In keeping informed about the status of a case, local counsel obliges
himself to warn nonresident counsel of impending deadlines. If he is
monitoring the discovery process, local counsel should alert nonresident
counsel to changes in the law that might affect the discovery process and
of which nonresident counsel is unaware.
The justifications offered for local association rules, however, sug-
gest a more active role for local counsel. Under the "convenience" justi-
fication, the "readily communicate" rule would require local counsel not
only to communicate the status of the case to the court or opposing
counsel, but also to have the authority to act for the client when nonresi-
dent counsel is unavailable. Under the "competence" justification, the
"readily communicate" rule would require an extremely active role for
local counsel in order to ensure that the information he communicates
to the court and opposing counsel is accurate. A similarly active local
counsel is needed if the courts expect local counsel to control the unethi-
cal behavior of the nonresident counsel. Although it is unrealistic to be-
lieve that local counsel can monitor the ethical conduct of nonresident
counsel, the "ethical conduct" justification does require a degree of ac-
tive participation that will enable local counsel to monitor the conduct
of nonresident counsel.
The third group of rules, which describe local counsel as "co-coun-
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sel,"'133 "associate counsel,"13 4 "of counsel,"' 3 5 or "counsel of record,"'13 6
seem to require even a greater degree of participation than do the "read-
ily communicate" rules. Neither the terms describing the role of local
counsel nor the rules themselves explicitly define local counsel's duties.
One must look to federal and state cases and statutes that use the terms,
often in only analogous situations, for guidance as to their meaning.
The "co-counsel" rules imply that local counsel should be a partici-
pating party with the authority to bind the client. In contexts other
than thepro hac vice situation, however, at least one court has interpreted
the term "co-counsel" as merely a descriptive term that is ultimately
given meaning by the lawyers when they determine, by agreement, their
respective responsibilities. 137 If local "co-counsel" serves as the co-equal
of nonresident counsel, he is better able to serve the competency, ethical,
and convenience functions attributed to the local association rules.
Some courts imply that the label "co-counsel" indicates parity of re-
sponsibility, a38 at least more so than descriptions such as "associate
counsel"' 39 or "of counsel." At the very least, "co-counsel" implies an
active partner in the conduct of the litigation.
The rules describing local counsel as "associate counsel" are simi-
larly unenlightening. The term "associate" counsel seems to indicate a
less than equal status but, at the same time, active, responsible partici-
pation.'40 In the few cases that use the term "of counsel," courts have
implied that the person who is "of counsel" is more of an adviser to the
lead counsel, with a low-profile role and little, if any, client contact.' 4 1
The title "of counsel," however, does connote a degree of expertise upon
which lead counsel can rely. 14 2 Consequently, "of counsel" may be ac-
countable for giving erroneous or inadequate advice. The rules use the
term "counsel of record" in two different ways. In the first, limited
sense, "counsel of record" merely indicates counsel regularly admitted to
practice before the court. 43 Even this restricted meaning gives the
133 S.D. ALA. R. I(E)(ii). See also note 33 supra.
134 S.D. OHIO R. 3 (O)(4). See also note 34 supra.
135 See N.D. IND. R. l(d).
136 E.D. PA. R. 13(a). See note 35 supra.
137 In Oberman v. Reilly, 66 A.D.2d 686, 411 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1978), the court allowed a
division of attorneys' fees based upon the division of authority between "co-counsel."
138 See, e.g., State v. Lerner, 112 R.I. 62, 90, 308 A.2d 324, 341 (1973).
139 Brown v. Wood, 257 Ark. 252, 256, 516 S.W.2d 98, 100 (1974).
140 In Cruis Along Boats, Inc. v. Langley, 255 Md. 139, 142-43, 257 A.2d 184, 186 (1969),
the court rejected the theory that associated counsel is not "real counsel." See aro In re Do-
ran's Estate, 138 Cal. App. 2d 541, 292 P.2d 655 (1956).
141 See De Parcq v. United States Dist. Court, 235 F.2d 692, 694 (8th Cir. 1956); Nightin-
gale v. Oregon Cent. Ry., 18 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Or. 1873) (No. 10,264); Keogh v. Pearson,
35 F.R.D. 20,24 (D.D.C. 1964); People v. Bruinsma, 34 Mich. App. 167, 173-75, 191 N.W.2d
108, 111 (1971); Roskind v. Brown, 29 A.D.2d 549, 550, 285 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411-12 (1967).
142 Kiser v. Bailey, 92 Misc. 2d 435, 440, 400 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1977).
143 See In re Miltones, Inc., 286 F. 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1922).
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"counsel of record" a certain degree of responsibility; under federal law,
for example, a motion to disqualify a federal trial judge must be made
by "counsel of record."'' 1 In the second, broader sense, the "counsel of
record" is the legal counsel, the one who assumes the ultimate responsi-
bility for the conduct of the case.145 This second meaning clearly re-
quires a more responsible role for local counsel.
Local counsel often assumes various other duties as well. In a few
jurisdictions, local counsel must sign the initial pleadings or sign docu-
ments,146 thereby ratifying the contents of the documents.147 Thus, by a
simple act required by court rule, local counsel exposes himself to poten-
tial liability for errors that may not be his own. Other rules require local
counsel to "participate"'148 or "appear"'149 in the case. 150 These terms,
144 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976); see United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384, 391 (M.D. Pa.
1958).
145 "It is our considered judgment that an attorney of record can best be described as the
person (or persons) in charge of a client's business in any action, suit or proceeding." Home
Ins. Co. v. Sormanti Realty Corp., 102 R.I. 187, 192, 229 A.2d 296, 299 (1967). See a/so
United States v. McCoy, 573 F.2d 14, 16 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 958 (1978); Nickel
Rim Mines Ltd. v. Universal-Cyclops Steel Corp., 202 F. Supp. 170, 174-75 (D.N.J. 1962);
Brown v. Wood, 257 Ark. 252, 256, 516 S.W.2d 98, 100 (1974); Burlington County Internal
Medicine Assocs. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 168 N.J. Super. 382, 384, 403 A.2d 43, 44 (Ch.
1979); Roskind v. Brown, 29 A.D.2d 549, 550, 285 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411-12 (1967).
146 See note 40 sup ra.
147 FED. R. Cv. P. 11 states:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule
in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certifi-
cate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of 1ais knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the
action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is
inserted.
For a discussion of the history and interpretation of rule 11, see 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 2, § 1333. See also Chandler Supply Co. v. GAF Corp., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
258 (9th Cir. 1980); Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964) (civil rights
case in which court waived local rule requiring that the petition be signed by local counsel
because no local counsel could be found to sign petition and therefore endorse its contents);
United States v. American Surety Co., 25 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). In Slayman v.
Steinhoff, 195 Kan. 88, 89, 340 P.2d 98, 99 (1959), the court stated that the purpose of the
Kansas statute requiring local counsel to sign the complaint was "to insure that the court will
have ready jurisdiction over counsel... at all times." This implies responsibility of local
counsel for the contents of the complaint. But see De Parcq v. United States Dist. Court, 235
F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1956).
148 See D. HAWAII R. l(e); D. OR. R. 3(c); D. UTAH R. 1(c).
149 See D. IDAHO R. 2(d); N.D. IowA R. 5(F); S.D. IOWA R. 5(F); E.D.N.C.R. I.E.
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just as the others, are susceptible of different meanings. Clearly, all the
rules contemplate active involvement by local counsel-just how active
is unpredictable.
In the fourth descriptive group, local association rules make local
counsel at least co-equal to nonresident counsel by specifically requiring
that local counsel be able to act in all matters for the client. 151 The
District of Alaska goes even further, requiring local counsel to be the
"lead" counsel.152 In essence, these rules place complete responsibility
for the client's case on local counsel unless the attorneys can agree
among themselves to limit contractually the responsibility of local coun-
sel. Because district court rules have the force of law,153 it is unlikely
that counsel can contract away that which the local rules require.15 4 In
any case, as is true with all the descriptive groups, the rules are not
sufficiently precise to outline the exact responsibilities of local counsel
and thus leave local counsel unsure of his sphere of accountability.
Under the fifth descriptive group of rules, the court must assign
respective responsibilities to local and nonresident counsel.'5 5 Even if
one does not question the court's right to direct the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the guidelines set out by the court may not be any more spe-
cific than the ambiguous descriptions of local counsel's role found in
local rules.1 56 Consequently, even within this group of rules, local coun-
150 Kansas does not permit the court to "entertain . . . [i e. ]to receive and take into consid-
eration," any action in which local counsel is not associated. Bradley v. Sudler, 172 Kan. 367,
371, 239 P.2d 921, 923 (1952).
151 See D. ALAsKA R. 3(C)(3); C.D. CAL R. 1(b)(3); D. NEB. R. 5.G.
152 D. ALASKA R. 3(C)(3): "Local counsel shall be primarily responsible to the Court for
the conduct of all stages of the proceedings. .. ."
153 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83. See also MacNeil v. Hearst Corp., 160 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D.
Del. 1958).
154 6A A. CoRBiN, CorRAcTs § 1374 (1962).
155 See note 46 supra.
156 In Burlington County Internal Medicine Assocs. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 168
NJ. Super. 382, 384-85,403 A.2d 43,44-45 (Ch. 1979), the court required out-of-state counsel
to file certain information before the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, would admit the
attorney pro hac vice. The information consisted of proof
(1) that foreign counsel is of good standing in his state and is associated with
[local] counsel of good standing here. A certificate from the official of the
[foreign state] authorized to attest to the good standing of attorneys must be
submitted. ... Good standing of [local] counsel is acknowledged;
(2) by affidavit of foreign counsel, that he has maintained his competence as
an attorney, particularly in any specialization which he claims, through expe-
rience, schools, lectures and readings;
(3) by letter of defendant, that it desires to be represented by [out-of-state]
counsel in New Jersey, stating reasons;
(4) good cause, presented in affidavit form, which may consist of: (a) a show-
ing that the cause involves a complex field of law in which counsel is a special-
ist, (b) a long held attorney-client relationship, (c) lack of local counsel with
expertise in the field involved, (d) the existence of legal questions involving
the law of the foreign jurisdiction, (e) the need for extensive discovery pro-
ceedings in the foreign jurisdiction. In the event the defense request is
granted, counsel's admission will be subject to appropriate conditions ....
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sel may have difficulty determining his precise responsibilities. The
foregoing attempt to discern the duties of local associated counsel indi-
cates that local counsel has no way of predicting just what is expected
and required of him. The lack of any clear justification for the associa-
tion rules, the vague and ambiguous wording of the rules, the dearth of
judicial interpretation of the rules, and the discretion and independence
of the federal district court judge all point to a possible result extremely
detrimental to the associated attorney: the duties of local counsel may
become "known" only retrospectively when the jury deliberates the mal-
practice liability of local counsel for the actions or inactions of nonresi-
dent counsel.
II
MALPRACTICE LIABILrrY OF LOCAL COUNSEL
Because of the ambiguity of local rules, local counsel cannot deter-
mine what responsibilities-thus, what potential liabilities-he has ac-
cepted. If local counsel knew precisely what duties he must bear, he
could act accordingly and set a fee commensurate with both the time
necessary to carry out his prescribed duties and the risk of a malpractice
judgment.15 7 Because he is frequently unable to determine the precise
scope of his responsibilities, however, local counsel runs the risk of serv-
ing, for a relatively small fee, as an insurer of the competency of nonresi-
dent counsel. If one concedes that the local association rules are
intended primarily to ensure competent and ethical practice before the
local federal court, the broad role of local counsel with its broad liability
seems most appropriate. This broad liability, however, requires larger
fees reflecting the increased duties and risks assumed by local counsel.
But with the larger fees comes the need for stronger justifications for the
association rule-and such justifications do not exist.
[He must] (B) advise the court immediately if he ceases to be an attorney in
good standing of the foreign jurisdiction; (C) continue to be associated with
[local] counsel throughout the trial of the cause and to obey the strictures of
[the local rules]; (D) consent to the service of process upon associated [local]
counsel in any suit brought against him and his firm arising from his partici-
pation in the within cause, with the understanding that such service subjects
him to the jurisdiction of this court; (E) recognize and follow [local] customs
of practice in addition to its Rules of Court; (F) conduct all discovery pro-
ceedings in [the local state], through [local] counsel, unless opposing counsel
agrees to a different arrangement; (G) not apply for any continuances respect-
ing motions and trials on the ground that he is committed to appear before a
court of a foreign jurisdiction, other than a federal court; (H) file a certificate
issued by a responsible insurance company showing that he is covered by ade-
quate malpractice insurance.
157 The attorney must factor in the risk of malpractice suits when establishing his fee. Se
R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRArcCE § 454 (1977).
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Neither the present Code of Professional Responsibility 158 nor the
recent attempts to re-codify the law of professional responsibility 59 ade-
quately particularize the obligations of local counsel. Although the
present Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes counsel to
render competent 160 and zealous 16 1 representation while avoiding even
the appearance of impropriety, it does not address specific duties of local
counsel. 162 The Kutak Commission's Model Rules, a recent attempt to
improve "the ethical premises and problems of the profession of law,"' 6 3
offer only similar generalities. 164 The Model Rules' only arguable con-
tribution to determining the role of local counsel relates to the discussion
of the responsibilities of a supervisory lawyer. 6 5 The Model Rules re-
quire that a supervisory lawyer make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the lawyers under his control conform to the rules of professional con-
duct. 166 Local counsel can therefore conclude that if he has supervisory
158 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
159 See ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft, May 1981) [hereinafter cited as KUTAK
MODEL RULES]; THE RoscoE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, The Ameri-
can Lawyer's Code of CondiZt 401 (Public Discussion Draft, June 1980); NATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON STUDY OF THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Jan. 30, 1980).
160 ABA CODE, supra note 158, Canon 6.
161 Id. Canon 7.
162 Id. Canon 9.
163 KUTAK MODEL RULES, .sufra note 159, Chairman's Introduction.
164 "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competence consists of
the legal knowledge, skill and thoroughness, preparation and efficiency reasonably necessary
for the representation." KUTAK MODEL RULES, "ufira note 159, at 7.
165 Id. at 170-72.
166 RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OFA PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER
(a) A PARTNER IN A LAW FIRM SHALL MAKE REASONABLE EF-
FORT TO ENSURE THAT ALL LAWYERS IN THE FIRM, INCLUD-
ING OTHER PARTNERS, CONFORM TO THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
(b) A LAWYER HAVING SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER AN-
OTHER LAWYER SHALL MAKE REASONABLE EFFORT TO EN-
SURE THAT THE OTHER LAWYER CONFORMS TO THE RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
(c) A LAWYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANOTHER LAW-
YER'S VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
IF:
(1) THE LAWYER ORDERS OR RATIFIES THE CONDUCT IN-
VOLVED; OR
(2) THE LAWYER IS A PARTNER IN THE LAW FIRM IN WHICH
THE OTHER LAWYER IS A PARTNER OR ASSOCIATE, OR HAS
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER THE OTHER LAWYER,
AND KNOWS OF THE CONDUCT AT A TIME WHEN ITS CON-
SEQUENCES CAN BE AVOIDED OR MITIGATED BUT FAILS TO
TAKE REASONABLE REMEDIAL ACTION.
Id. at 170.
[Vol. 67:345
LOCAL ASSOCIATED COUNSEL
authority 67 over the nonresident counsel, he must supervise! The vague
provisions of The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct Public Discus-
sion Draftlcr> and the Report of the National Organization of Bar Coun-
sel' 69 are likewise of little assistance. Thus, the uncertainties contained
in the present Code of Professional Conduct and its proposed successors
merely reinforce the uneasiness that ensues when one undertakes the re-
sponsibilities of local associated counsel.
Virtually no courts have addressed the issue of local counsel's liabil-
ity for acts of nonresident counsel. Nonresident counsel has an obliga-
tion to tell the client that he is associating local counsel 170 and to get the
client's permission to do so. 17' The nonresident counsel may also be lia-
ble for associating a local attorney whom he knew, or should have
known, would not adequately represent the client's interests. 72 Al-
though courts have indicated that co-counsel may be liable for each
other's acts,173 the reported decisions have not yet gone past this point.
Babich v. Clower174 presents a situation in which local counsel's own
negligent actions might give rise to malpractice liability. In Babich,
plaintiff's counsel failed to file notice of appeal after the district court in
the Eastern District of Virginia had dismissed plaintiffs complaint.
167 The comments to rule 5.1 indicate that the existence of supervisory authority is a
question of fact. Id. at 170-71.
168 See, e.g., rule 4.1: "At a minimum, a lawyer shall serve a client with skill and care
commensurate with that generally afforded to clients by other lawyers in similar matters,"
THE ROSCOE PouND-AmERIcAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, supra note 159, at 401.
Rule 4.5 might be interpreted, however, as requiring that any limitation on the normal attor-
ney-client relationship be limited by the client: "A lawyer shall keep a client currently ap-
prised of all significant developments in the matter entrusted to the lawyer by the client,
unless the client has instructed the lawyer to do otherwise." Id.
169 See, e.g., NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, sufira note 159. The N.O.B.C.
draft does require, however, that a division of legal fees must be made known to the client.
Id., Proposed Rule DR 2-197, at 27. The draft also contains similar provisions as does the
Kutak Commission Report on the duties of supervisory lawyers. Id. at 9.
170 See Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc., 15 Ill. App. 3d 494,501,304 N.E.2d 720, 726 (1973),
reio'don other grounds, 60 IIl. 2d 141, 324 N.E.2d 417 (1975).
171 Mackler v. Richard Hyde Estate, Inc., 199 Misc. 837, 838, 105 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277-78
(App. T. 1951).
172 ee Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159, 1170-71 (D.N.J. 1975).
173 See, e.g., Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 671, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98, 106 (1960). See
also Livingston v. Cox, 6 Pa. 360, 366 (1847). Nonetheless, the responsibilities and therefore
the liabilities of co-counsel may be limited contractually as the "mere association of other
counsel does not create a partnership between the associated attorneys." R. MALLEN & V.
LEvIT, sufpra note 157, § 36 and cases cited therein. The uncertainty of the liability of associ-
ated counsel can be seen in the following summary of the law in Gates & Zilly, LegalMarac-
lice, in ABA DIVISION OF EDUcATION, PROFESSIONAL FRSPoNSiBILrrY: A GUIDE FOR
ATrORNEYS 311, 315 (1978):
When an attorney associates another attorney for a particular matter, with
the client's knowledge and consent, the first attorney is ordinarily not vicari-
ously liable for the negligence of the second attorney, provided the latter's
negligence was an independent act; in such situations, it is advisable to specify
the respective duties of the attorneys.
174 528 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Counsel, whose office was in Washington, D. C., claimed that he had
never received the court's order dismissing the complaint and conse-
quently never knew to file an appeal. 175 The local rules of the Eastern
District of Virginia provide that timely service upon local counsel is
equivalent to service on the nonresident counsel for whom he appears.176
Local counsel was not familiar with the local rules and assumed that
nonresident counsel would also receive a copy of the court's order. On
motion for an extension of time to file an appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reinstated the appeal, concluding that the trial court's order reasonably
could have been interpreted to indicate that the order dismissing the
complaint had been mailed to counsel in Washington. 177 Local counsel
thus was spared liability for an error that could have resulted in dismis-
sal of the plaintiff's case.
In time, more sophisticated malpractice cases may impose liability
upon local counsel for the acts of nonresident counsel. Such liability can
be based on the duty of local counsel either as explicitly imposed by
local rule or as implied from the local rule in light of the justification it
purportedly serves--ensuring competent and ethical counsel. Local
counsel, given the responsibility by the local association rule. "meaning-
fully [to] participate in the preparation and trial of the case, 1 78 or des-
ignated as the person "with whom the Court and opposing counsel may
readily communicate regarding the conduct of the case,"' 179 or desig-
nated "co-counsel,"' 80 or required to "appear" in the litigation,181 can
hardly disclaim responsibility for damages resulting from the failure ad-
equately to prosecute or defend the suit. When local counsel signs the
pleadings as required by local rule, 8 2 he can hardly disclaim liability by
arguing that his signature is a mere formality. Even in those districts in
which local counsel's only apparent duty is to receive service of papers,
he may be accountable for obvious acts of malpractice, such as failure to
meet the statute of limitations or failure to file a notice of appeal.' 83
Local counsel might seek to limit his potential malpractice liability
by contracting with nonresident counsel to delineate precisely his du-
ties.' 84 In a subsequent malpractice action, the court might give some
175 Id. at 294.
176 E.D. VA. R. 7(D).
177 528 F.2d at 296.
178 D. HAwAIt R. I (c); see note 41 supra.
179 See note 32 supra.
180 See note 34 sup ra.
181 See note 38 sup ra.
182 See notes 40 & 147 sura.
183 See note 132 supra.
184 See text accompanying note 154 supra. In Keenan, Pro Hoc Vice: Revitalii'ng a
WoundedSpedalty, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOCAcY 23, 37 (1980), it is suggested that the motion to
appearpro hoc vice provide "[ain outline of the responsibilities of local counsel, to include:
(a) making all non-trial appearances,
[Vol. 67:345
9]LOCAL ASSOCIA TED COUNSEL
weight to such a contract if the local rules are sufficiently ambiguous.
But a court could not give effect to a contractual division of authority
and liability that contravenes the division of authority implicitly or ex-
plicitly required by the local rule. 8 5
III
PROPOSAL
Commentators desiring to liberalize bar admission requirements
rely heavily on constitutional theories, including the flow of interstate
commerce, 8 6 to create a right in lawyers to conduct multistate prac-
tices. In addition, the interests of the client often enter the debate;
again, the discussion drifts immediately into the constitutional realm,
and attempts are made to include a right to have counsel of one's choice
free of boundary restrictions 8 7 within the sixth amendment. 188 This Ar-
ticle focuses on legislative choices rather than constitutional mandates
and proposes statutory restrictions on the ability of federal district courts
to require nonresident counsel to associate local counsel. The arguments
are addressed to Congress instead of the individual federal district courts
because of the need for uniformity and because the local association
rules have attained such importance as a symbol of the autonomy of
federal district courts that the courts may be unwilling to effect any sub-
stantial change.
A. Costs and Benefits of Local Association Rules
This Article has already discussed the benefits that the client pur-
portedly derives from local association rules. 18 9 In short, the rules are
designed to protect the client from his own choices. 19 The rules force
(b) receiving, duplicating, and dispatching to opposing counsel all pleadings
and notices,
(c) scheduling and notifying opposing counsel as to discovery dates."
185 Local rules have the force of law; duties imposed on one party by these rules cannot
be shifted contractually to another party. Se note 154 supra.
186 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 116.
187 See Note, sura note 89.
188 Ye, e.g., United States v. Bergamo, 154 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1946).
189 &e text accompanying note 53 sup ra.
19o See Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80, 87-88 (D. Conn.), afd, 429 U.S. 876
(1976). In Burlington County Internal Medicine Assocs. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 168
N.J. Super. 382, 384,403 A.2d 43,44 (1979), the court required the client tojustify a need for
foreign counsel and limited the grounds for such justification to five:
(a) a showing that the cause involves a complex field of law in which counsel
is a specialist,
(b) a long held attorney-client relationship,
(c) lack of local counsel with expertise in the field involved,
(d) the existence of legal questions involving the law of the foreign
jurisdiction,
(e) the need for extensive discovery proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction.
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the client to accept local counsel's "insights" into local practice and ju-
dicial idiosyncracies whether he wants them or not. Even assuming that
courts should try to protect clients from incompetent or unethical be-
havior, they fail to achieve this result under the present rules.' 9' If the
client desires the assistance of lopal counsel, he should be able to select,
with the advice of his nonresident counsel, the terms of association that
fit his particular needs.
The costs to the client of associating local counsel are difficult to
quantify. 92 The client pays a premium whether or not local counsel
actually guards against incompetent and unethical nonresident counsel.
The additional expense is wasted unless nonresident counsel actually
needs such guidance. Because of the lack of data concerning the relative
competency of individual attorneys, 93 there is no way to assess how
often the client needs this guarantee of competency. Furthermore, it is
not unlikely that the client has retained the nonresident counsel pre-
cisely because of his reputation for competent legal service. ' 94 But even
if local association rules are an effective guarantee of attorney compe-
tency, the client is not necessarily unprotected without them. A dissatis-
fied client can resort to a malpractice suit against nonresident counsel
or, at least, can terminate his relationship with the incompetent
attorney.
It is argued that nonresident counsel benefits from the association
rules by having the assistance of local counsel when he is incapable of
adequate representation and is unwilling to admit his lack of compe-
tence to the client. Use of local counsel for this purpose, however, con-
travenes the Code of Professional Responsiblity, which requires a lawyer
to practice only in matters in which he is competent. 95 Moreover, al-
191 See text accompanying note 82 supra.
192 From a monetary standpoint, it is very difficult to determine the additional cost of the
requirement of local counsel. It is assumed by the courts, see Spanos v. Skouras Theatres
Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir.) (on reconsideration en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987
(1966), and by the commentators, see Comment, supra note 116, at 754, that the requirement
is costly. It has also been noted that "[l]ocal counsel, anticipating no continuing relationship
with the client, may tend to exaggerate his billings to the client." Kalish, supra note 68, at
394. In Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 476, 357 P.2d 782, 786 (1960), appeal dim issed sub non.
Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961), at a time when minimum fee schedules were allowed, it
was alleged that the Wyandotte County Bar Associations required "that local counsel be
compensated approximately one-third to one-half of the fee of the particular litigation." In
Comment, supra note 93, at 1017 n.31, 34.7% of all responding practitioners believed that the
local counsel rules had a detrimental effect in increasing the cost of litigation. In Atkins v.
State Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1969), the delay in filing was attributed to the
costs of retaining local counsel.
193 See generallY Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE L.J. 590 (1973).
194 See text accompanying note 81 sup ra.
195 ABA CODE, sura note 158, Canon 6: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Compe-
tently." See also id. EC-1: a lawyer "should accept employment only in matters which he is or
intended to become competent to handle"; Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 A.D. 477, 481, 195
N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1922); KTrrAK MODEL RULES, supra note 159, § 1.1 (Jan. 30, 1980).
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though local counsel may provide valuable assistance in some cases, the
need for that assistance depends both on the case and the expertise of
the nonresident counsel. A uniform rule requiring association in every
case often will require association of local counsel when it is neither nec-
essary nor desirable. The client and his nonresident counsel should de-
cide whether to associate local counsel and, if so, should be free to
determine the scope of local counsel's responsibilities.
Although the claimed benefits of requiring local association are du-
bious, the costs are clear. The local association rules disrupt the normal
lawyer-client relationship-a relationship of confidentiality and confi-
dence-by ihterposing a third party, often with undetermined responsi-
bilities, into the relationship. If local counsel has the authority to bind
the client to his decisions 196 the interference is compounded, because
this dilutes the authority of nonresident counsel and client to control the
litigation.
Local counsel intrudes further in his role as "watchdog" for the
court. An active "watchdog" role requires that local counsel be kept
informed of all developments and reasoning behind each decision. If
this role includes reports to the court concerning the nonresident coun-
sel's behavior and conduct, the intrusion increases. Forced association
and ambiguously defined duties also lead to confusion and friction be-
tween local and nonresident counsel. In Baez v. S S Kresge Co. ,197 for
example, a lack of coordination between local and nonresident counsel
resulted in lost pleadings and a dismissal of the suit. In Smith v. Widman
Tmcing and Excavating, Inc. ,198 local trial counsel stipulated to a judg-
ment against the client. This stipulation was apparently beyond the
scope of authority of local counsel and resulted from a misunderstand-
ing between local counsel and the party's "regular" counsel.' 99
The benefits to local counsel from the local association rules are
primarily proprietary.2°° This Article propounds, however, that the po-
tential malpractice costs to local counsel have risen to such an extent
that local counsel either will have to increase his participation in the
litigation, with a concomitant increase in fees, or forego becoming local
counsel in order to avoid the risk of malpractice liability. This increase
in fees for local counsel would be duplicative and wasteful.
Although local association rules are supposed to ensure the integrity
of nonresident counsel, 201 the primary benefits of local association rules
to the courts are convenience and control.20 2 Requiring local counsel
196 D. ALASKA R. 3(c)(3); C.D. CAL. R. 1(b)(3); D. NEB. R. 5.G.
197 518 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
198 627 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1980).
199 Id. at 796-97.
200 See note 109 supra.
201 See notes 192-94 and accompanying text supra.
202 See note 98 sufra.
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ensures the court of the physical presence of counsel on short notice.20 3
Local counsel may also display greater deference to the court than non-
resident counsel. 20 4 The local rules may also facilitate communica-
tion,205 discipline,20 6 and service of process. 20 7 The federal courts could
achieve these benefits, when necessary, in a less obtrusive manner with a
uniform, limited right to require association of local counsel, perhaps as
an exercise of discretion on a case by case basis. A blanket rule requir-
ing association in every case is unnecessary.
B. Mechanicsfor Change
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83208 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071209 au-
thorize federal district courts to adopt local rules of practice. Although
many individual rules are truly administrative in character, every dis-
trict court has adopted rules that affect legal rights. 210 Because of the
scope of local rulemaking authority by the federal district courts and
accompanying abuses,21' the practice of law in the local federal district
courts throughout the nation is anything but uniform.212 Courts adopt
local rules with a simple majority vote of the local federal district court
judges,21 3 and there is virtually no national level of review over the rules
adopted by local courts.214 The independence evidenced by the individ-
ual federal district courts forces two conclusions. First, individual courts
are unlikely to relinquish control over admission rules through a liberal-
ized association rule. Second, there can be uniformity among associa-
tion rules only if association standards are adopted at the national level.
An effort to change the present association policy could concentrate
on either of the two sources of rulemaking authority: the Federal Rules
203 For an example of unavailability of nonresident counsel, see People v. Bruinsma, 34
Mich. App. 167, 191 N.W.2d 108 (1971). In the survey of federal judges, the necessity of local
counsel to guarantee appearances was recognized as a major reason for requiring local coun-
sel. Agata, supra note 64, at 381.
204 See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
205 See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
206 See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
207 See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
208 See note 2 supra.
209 Id.
210 See J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318
(7th Cir. 1976); Cohn, Federal Discovey: A Suruq of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed
Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253, 292 (1979); Flanders, sura note 10, at 35.
211 See 12C. WRIGlrr &A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 3151. But see Flanders, supra note 10,
at 35.
212 The lack of uniformity even within the Ninth Circuit has caused the district judges of
the Circuit to seek uniform local rule for all district courts in the Ninth Circuit. See E.
CLEARY & R. MIsNER, supra note 16.
213 FEDt. R. Civ. P. 83. The district courts must submit their rules and amendments to
the Supreme Court. See note 7 supra.
214 The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, however, requires local rules implementing the Act to
be sent to the circuit court for approval. 18 U.S.C. § 3165(c) (1976).
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of Civil Procedure or the United States Code. The federal rules now
have no provision specifically treating admission to practice in the fed-
eral courts. An amendment to rule 83 could withdraw from local dis-
trict courts the power to limit pro hac vice admissions, but it is
undesirable to correct every flaw in rulemaking authority in this man-
ner. As a matter of drafting, it makes no sense to list exceptions to the
broad grant of authority contained in rule 83. A more rational method
of change would be a congressional amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1654215
that would allow clients to be represented by counsel of their choice
before any district court. It should be noted that neither the United
States Supreme Court 216 nor the courts of appeals217 have any geo-
graphic or local association requirements.
C. Proposal for Change
A statutory amendment designed to provide the benefits of the as-
sociation rules without imposing the costs should contain two elements:
a statement limiting the district court's ability to require local associated
counsel and a statement granting to the district court the discretionary
authority to discipline any lawyer who involves himself in an action
pending in the court.
This Article does not address the broader question of national stan-
dards for admission to practice.218 An.attempt to establish national
standards for admission to practice either in the federal or state courts
will encompass a decade of debate.219 This Article proposes a limited
cure to an immediate problem. This rather limited proposal should give
some insight, however, into the effect of reducing barriers to lawyers so
that a client can receive representation by a lawyer of his choice despite
the locus of the litigation.
The amendment should first contain a statement limiting local dis-
trict courts' ability to require local associated counsel. The primary
function the association rules serve is to ensure availability of counsel.
Normally, communication betweeen the court, counsel, and opposing
counsel can be achieved by telephone. There may be cases, however, in
215 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976).
216 Sup. CT. R. 5.1.
217 FED. R. APP. P. 46(a).
218 For a discussion of the general issue of national standards for admission to practice,
see REPORT AND TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER STAN-
DARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 85 F.R.D. 155, 208 (1979).
219 For example, at the August 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association
House of Delegates, a resolution seeking to standardize fro hoc vice admissions in state courts
was defeated after a debate which covered topics such as states' rights, the multistate exami-
nation and economic interests of local attorneys. Reports andProposals, 27 CRIM. L. REP. 2470-
71 (Aug. 17, 1980).
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which counsel's presence becomes necessary 220 or nonresident counsel
purposefully hinders communication. Consequently, the amendment
should allow a district court to require local associated counsel after
there has been at least one substantial instance of unavailability of coun-
sel. If local counsel is then required, the court should specify in detail the
minimum duties of local counsel and make this specification a part of
the record.221 In every case, the minimum duties of local counsel should
be responsive to the reason for unavailability and should go no further
than is necessary to remedy that reason.
A rule similar to that proposed by this Article is already found in
admission requirements for the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion.222 Rule 3 of The Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation states:
Every member in good standing of the Bar of any district court of the
United States is entitled without condition to practice before the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Any attorney of record in any
action transferred under Section 1407 may continue to represent his
client in any district court of the United States to which such action is
transferred. Parties to any action transferred under Section 1407 are
not required to obtain local counsel in the district to which such ac-
tion is transferred.223
The Multidistrict Litigation statute and rules promulgated under the
statute have as their purpose the "just and efficient conduct" 224 of civil
actions which have multidistrict ramifications. For the client's choice of
counsel, the proposed amendment characterizes virtually any litigation
in which a nonresident or resident client chooses a nonresident counsel
as "multidistrict." One must expect that participants in a federal sys-
tem of courts may come from various geographic segments of the feder-
alized whole.225
The second necessary component of the proposed amendment is a
statement that a lawyer who appearspro hac vice is subject to the juris-
diction of the court for purposes of discipline. Arguably, courts already
have the inherent authority to discipline those attorneys who appear
220 There are some cases such as where temporary restraining orders are used in which a
lawyer's continued presence is necessary.
221 The detail must be greater than that found in the court's order in Burlington County
Internal Medicine Assocs. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 168 N.J. Super. 382, 403 A.2d 43 (Ch.
1979). See also Keenan, supra note 184.
222 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
223 Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 3, 28 U.S.C. app.
§ 1407 (1976).
224 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., Committee of the Judiciary 2d Sess. 1-2 (1968).
225 In 1975, the New York courts approved guidelines to implement a New York statute
which allows foreign attorneys, who are residents of New York, to advise clients on issues of
foreign law. See Slomanson, Foretign Legal Consultant: Multistate Modelfor Business and the Bar, 39
ALB. L. REV. 199 (1975).
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before them,226 but a clear grant of such authority by Congress would
assuage judicial opposition to this proposal.
It is worth repeating that until some reform is effected in the local
rules, local and nonresident counsel should carefully identify their re-
spective responsibilities. In those districts where the local rules are am-
biguous as to the precise obligations of local counsel, counsel should seek
a determination from the court that the duties assigned local counsel, by
contract or otherwise, meet the minimum obligations imposed by the
local rule.
Nonresident counsel naturally should keep the client informed con-
cerning any association of counsel outside the firm and any agreement
between counsel as to individual duties. This is in keeping with the gen-
eral proposition that a client should choose who is to represent him.227
During this interim period, local members of the bar should at-
tempt to convince the local federal court to alter its local association
rules. Lawyers should also work through their local, state, and national
bar associations to lobby Congress for legislative change. These interim
solutions, however, affect only one case or one district court at a time,
and thus can be only stop-gap measures.
CONCLUSION
The local rules requiring associated counsel in pro hac vice admis-
sions in federal court must be changed. The association rules unfairly
restrict the relationship between the client and the nonresident counsel.
The local association rules fail to give notice to local counsel of his pre-
cise duties and, consequently, subject local counsel to an undetermina-
ble risk of malpractice liability. This latter circumstance should, and
will, give impetus for change. For the sake of uniformity and speed,
changes in the association rules should come from Congress in the form
of an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, limiting the district courts' abil-
ity to require association and granting to district courts the authority to
discipline lawyers who appear before them.
226 See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
227 EC 2-22 provides: "Without the consent of his client, a lawyer should not associate in
a particular matter another lawyer outside his firm. A fee may properly be divided between
lawyers properly associated if the division is in proportion to the services performed and the
responsibility assumed by each lawyer and if the total fee is reasonable."
This basic proposition is fundamental to our legal system. It is evidenced throughout the
Code of Professional Responsibility in many ways, such as EC 2-7 (discussing the selection of
a lawyer) and DR 2-110 (withdrawal from employment).
1982]
